Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators\u27 Sails in Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster by Dunkelberger, Travis
Volume 60 
Issue 6 Tolle Lege, Volume 60 Article 9 
1-18-2016 
Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators' Sails in 
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster 
Travis Dunkelberger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Litigation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Travis Dunkelberger, Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators' Sails in Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. 
v. Dempster, 60 Vill. L. Rev. Tolle Lege 121 (2016). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 




THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES THE WIND OUT OF FRIVOLOUS LITIGATORS’ 




“The U.S. has more costs of litigation per person than any other industrialized 
nation in the world, and it is crippling our economy.”1 
 
I. LEARNING THE ROPES: DETERMINING ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION  
 
$700,000.  According to a 2007 survey, this figure represents the average 
cost incurred by parties litigating trade dress claims.2  Unsurprisingly, this high 
price has a huge impact on whether companies are capable of defending—or 
even initiating—trade dress claims.3  For some, these numbers could mean 
risking the entire company’s viability for the sake of protecting its trade dress 
rights.4  Such risk comes with a silver lining, however, as litigants may seek 
 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012, The 
Pennsylvania State University.   
1.  JEFFREY H. CORBETT & PATRICK J. KISH, BEHIND THE OFFSHORE VEIL 165 
(quoting U.S. Rep. Jack Kingston) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2.  See David Pardue, Wisconsin Court of Appeals Determines That the Glove Fits: 
Trade Dress Suit Was a Covered Advertising Injury Claim Triggering Duty to Defend, TRADE 
SECRETS & IP TODAY (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:39 AM), 
http://tradesecretstoday.blogspot.com/2012/04/wisconsin-cout-of-appeals-determines.html 
[http://perma.cc/JJS6-MNK8] (referencing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT 
OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2007)). 
3.  See, e.g., Ashlee Kieler, Deal with Hershey’s Puts an End to Import of Cadbury 
Chocolates, CONSUMERIST (Jan. 26, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/01/26/deal-with-
hersheys-puts-an-end-to-import-of-cadbury-chocolates/ [http://perma.cc/5DEB-P5P7] (“It is 
important for Hershey to protect its trademark rights and to prevent consumers from being 
confused or misled when they see a product name or product package that is confusingly 
similar to a Hershey name or trade dress.” (quoting Jeff Beckman, Hershey representative) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The lawsuit by Hershey prohibits the import of British-
produced Cadbury Chocolate and threatens to put businesses that sell those products out of 
business.  See Parija Kavilanz, Trademark Wars Heat Up. Be Ready., CNNMONEY (Dec. 1, 
2011, 11:50 AM) http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/01/smallbusiness/trademark/ 
[http://perma.cc/25YQ-UA2K] (examining manner in which trade dress litigation can 
substantially affect small businesses).  Matthew Swyers, founder of the Trademark Company, 
offered advice on costs to potential litigants stating “[I]f [litigation] fees start exceeding your 
returns, maybe it’s better to settle and change the trademark and still keep the business.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
4.  See, e.g., Ryan Richardson, Apple v. Samsung: Tech Trial of the Century, ILL. BUS. 
L.J. (Feb. 8, 2014) http://www.law.illinois.edu/bljournal/post/2014/02/08/Apple-v-Samsung-
Tech-Trial-of-the-Century [http://perma.cc/EXV9-SDWG] (explaining lawsuit over trademark 
and trade dress between Apple and Samsung).  In 2012, a jury found that Samsung weakened 
1
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attorneys’ fees against frivolous claims to help recoup expenditures associated 
with trade dress lawsuits.5 
Even for successful litigants, winning the suit does not automatically 
guarantee the court will award attorneys’ fees.6  Until 2014, trade dress litigants 
in the Third Circuit could only recover attorneys’ fees if the court found the 
case to be “exceptional” after application of a two-step process.7  This 
fee-assessment method—which the court applied restrictively, awarding fees in 
only narrow, limited circumstances—considered (1) whether the parties 
exhibited culpable conduct; and (2) whether the culpable conduct was 
exceptional under the Lanham Act.8 
The Third Circuit, however, steered away from its restrictive standard in 
Fair Wind Sailing v. Dempster9 and instead adopted a broader definition of 
exceptional for trade dress claims under the Lanham Act.10  In Fair Wind 
 
the trade dress of Apple products and ordered Samsung to pay $1.05 billion dollars in 
damages.  See id.  However, due to technical issues with the jury’s calculations, a new trial 
was set with both parties seeking adjustments to the amount.  See id.  Despite Samsung 
remaining in business, the case demonstrates the huge risks associated with litigating trade 
dress rights.  See, e.g., Kavilanz, supra note 3 (describing risks inherent in trademark dress 
matters).  
5.  See Sharad K. Bijanki, Note, Redefining Attorney-Fee Shifting Under the Lanham 
Act: Protecting Small Businesses and Deterring Trademark Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
809, 811 (2013) (“By shifting litigation costs, the attorney-fee-shifting provision promotes 
enforcement by trademark holders and discourages trademark infringers.”). 
6.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).  By using a term as broad as exceptional, 
the Lanham Act creates some consistency issues as the different federal circuits apply varying 
standards.  See Richard J. Leighton, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in “Exceptional” Lanham Act 
Cases: A “Jumble” of “Murky” Law, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 849, 881 (2012) (discussing 
inconsistencies in application of “bad faith” standard in Lanham Act cases). 
7.  See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 First, the District Court must decide whether the defendant engaged in any 
culpable conduct.  We have listed bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing 
infringement as non-exclusive examples of the sort of culpable conduct that could 
support a fee award.  Moreover, the culpable conduct may relate not only to the 
circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the way the losing party 
handled himself during the litigation.  Second, if the District Court finds culpable 
conduct, it must decide whether the circumstances are “exceptional” enough to 
warrant a fee award. 
Id. (quoting Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir.2007)).  The two-step analysis from 
Green was used by the Third Circuit to “find culpability before awarding attorneys’ fees under 
the Lanham Act” for the past twenty years.  See id.  
8.  See Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47, 48 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(noting failure of lower court to articulate “explicit finding” that other party “acted willfully or 
in bad faith” before awarding fees), abrogated by Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 
2014).  The court in Ferrero found awarding attorney fees appropriate only in cases that 
“involve[d] deliberate attempts by the defendant to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff 
by applying plaintiff’s trademark to defendant’s goods.”  See id. at 48–49. 
9.  764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014).  
10.  See id. (importing alternative meaning of exceptional to assess attorneys’ fees in 
trademark claim); see also id. at 315 (remanding for district court’s determination on whether 
plaintiff’s claim was exceptional and required attorneys’ fees to be awarded).  The Third 
Circuit provided some guidelines by finding the court “may award fees as a result of either the 
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 6 [2014], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/9
2015] THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES THE WIND OUT 123 
 
Sailing, the Third Circuit imported the definition from a different intellectual 
property context, relying on the leading Supreme Court precedent in Octane 
Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness,11 a patent law case.12  Notwithstanding the 
involvement of patent law, the Third Circuit determined Octane Fitness’s 
approach created a more effective policy regarding attorneys’ fees.13  As a 
result, the Third Circuit’s broader interpretation of exceptional integrates 
different areas of intellectual property law to reduce frivolous litigation of 
meritless trade dress claims.14 
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit’s new interpretation of 
exceptional, which increases the likelihood of awarding attorneys’ fees under 
the Lanham Act and addresses the benefits that accompany the court’s 
willingness to import features from other areas of intellectual property law.15  
Part II discusses the Lanham Act and the development of awarding attorneys’ 
fees in the federal courts, and more recently, in the Third Circuit.16  Part III 
examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Fair Wind Sailing and focuses on the 
court’s reasoning for applying an alternative meaning of exceptional in the 
context of trademark claims.17  Part IV discusses the use of sanctions and fee-
shifting provisions to provide financial relief for litigants.18  Part V provides a 
guide for practitioners to avoid fee-shifting provisions by structuring trade dress 
 
circumstances of the Lanham Act violation or the way in which [they] litigated the claim.”  
See id. (citing Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
11.  134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014)  
12.  See id. 1756–57 (redefining exceptional to determine whether attorneys’ fees 
should be awarded in Patent Act cases); id. at 1756 (noting fee-shifting provisions in both 
Patent Act and Lanham Act contained identical language regarding attorneys’ fees (citing 
Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).  The 
Supreme Court also removed the clear and convincing evidence standard for parties seeking 
attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act.  See id. at 1758. 
13.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 314–15 (taking guidance from Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 285 of Patent Act, which addresses awarding attorneys’ fees in exceptional 
cases). 
14.  See id. (acknowledging new meaning of exceptional was imported from different 
area of intellectual property law).  Although patent and trademark claims are litigated under 
separate Acts, the identical statutory language in each Act’s attorneys’ fees provision allowed 
the court to apply the new, Patent-Act meaning of exceptional to the Lanham Act.  See id. at 
315 (“We believe that the Court was sending a clear message that it was defining 
‘exceptional’ not just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but for the fee provision in the 
Lanham Act as well.”). 
15.  See id. at 315 (explaining that Congress referenced § 285 while passing Lanham 
Act); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 7133 (1974), reprinted in 1974  U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 
7133 (“[A]lthough the patent law and the copyright law provide for reasonable attorney fees, 
this remedy is not now available in the trademark area.  The Department of Commerce 
believes and the Committee agrees that the remedy should be available in exceptional 
cases . . . .”). 
16.  For a discussion of the Lanham Act and development of awarding attorneys’ fees 
in exceptional cases, see infra notes 25–57 and accompanying text. 
17.  For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision to adopt a new meaning of 
exceptional, see infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
18.  For a discussion of motions for sanctions and fee-shifting provisions as avenues for 
recovering court costs, see infra notes 97–120 and accompanying text.  
3
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claims properly.19  Finally, Part VI concludes that Fair Wind Sailing 
demonstrates the unique ability of intellectual property to blend different areas 




II. BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES: COURTS ROCK THE BOAT BY 
BROADENING FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS  
 
To understand the significance of Fair Wind Sailing’s expansive standard, 
it is important to consider the development of the term exceptional in the 
broader context of intellectual property law.21  First, the Lanham Act, 
specifically Section 35(a), is discussed to explain its impact on trade dress 
claims by allowing courts to award attorneys’ fees to successful parties in 
litigation.22  Second, a comparative overview of the Patent Act—most notably 
Section 285—is provided to demonstrate its role in shaping fee-shifting 
provisions within the Third Circuit.23  Finally, consideration is given to the 
court’s redefining of the term exceptional to allow for greater recovery of 
attorneys’ fees, and the impact it will have on intellectual property claims 
moving forward.24 
 
A. The Lanham Act: An Anchor for Trade Dress Claims  
 
Trade dress claims involve disputes over a product’s physical appearance, 
the way the product is presented or promoted, or the product’s involvement with 
marketing strategies.25  These claims generally are brought when “the trade 
dress of two businesses is sufficiently similar to cause confusion among 
consumers,” and they are litigated under the Lanham Act, which regulates the 
 
19.  For a discussion of Fair Wind Sailing’s impact on practitioners and guidance for 
litigating trade dress clams, see infra notes 121–42 and accompanying text.  
        20.    See infra notes 143–45.  
21.  For a further discussion on the development of exceptional as it relates to awarding 
attorneys’ fees in patent and trademark claims, see infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
22.  See Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (providing cause of action in 
trade dress claims).  
23.  See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (permitting attorneys’ fees remedy in patent claims).  
24.  For a further discussion of the term exceptional as it relates to Third Circuit 
jurisprudence, see infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
25.  See Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Trade 
dress has been defined as the total image or overall appearance of a product, and includes, but 
is not limited to, such features as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or 
even a particular sales technique.”); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
763, 768 (1992) (“A trademark . . . includ[es] ‘any word, name, symbol, or device or any 
combination thereof’ used by any person ‘to identify and distinguish his or her goods, 
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)). 
4
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use of trademarks in commercial activity.26 
Created in 1946, the Lanham Act established a cause of action for trade 
dress infringement.27  Most notably, Section 43(a) includes protection for a 
party’s “trade dress,” which “has been defined as the total image or overall 
appearance of a product, and includes, but is not limited to, such features as 
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, [or] graphics . . . .”28  Trade 
dress may be anything from distinctive restaurant décor to the shape of various 
beverage bottles.29  The purpose of trade dress protection is to “secure the 
 
26.  See Trade Dress, THEFREEDICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Trade+dress [http://perma.cc/C5Y5-DJ65] (last visited Nov. 
4, 2015) (defining trade dress and describing basic trade dress claims); see also Lauren Krohn, 
Causes of Action for Trade Dress Infringement Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act [15 USC § 
1125(a)], 7 CAUSES ACTION 2d 725 (1995) (detailing trade dress claims under Lanham Act 
provisions).  In order to establish a prima facie case in an action under § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act the plaintiff must first show that: “The plaintiff has a protectable interest in its trade dress 
design, which will be established by evidence that the design (a) is inherently distinctive or (b) 
is at least descriptive and has acquired secondary meaning among consumers, and (c) is not 
functional.”  See id. (citations omitted).  The plaintiff must then show “[t]he defendant’s use 
of a similar trade dress design is likely to cause confusion among consumers as to the source 
of the parties’ goods or services.”  Id. (citation omitted); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (“The Lanham Act provides for the registration 
of trademarks, which it defines in § 45 to include ‘any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof [used or intended to be used] to identify and distinguish [a producer’s] 
goods’ . . . .” (alterations in original)).  Some examples of distinctive trademarks include 
Nike’s “swoosh” symbol in the clothing industry and “Tide” laundry detergent or “Camel” 
cigarettes in brand marketing.  See Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. at 210 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
27.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (detailing causes of action for trade dress claims).  Created 
in 1946, the Lanham Act was “enacted by Congress [] based on the power granted to it by the 
Commerce Clause.”  See Lanham Act, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act [https://perma.cc/6ESH-X7CY] (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2015). 
28.  See Sweet St. Desserts, Inc. v. Chudleigh’s Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 3d 530, 540 (E.D. Pa. 
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing types of trade dress that are protected 
under Lanham Act).  “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act [also] prohibits the use of ‘any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device . . .’ that is ‘likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods.’”  Id. (third 
alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
29.  See Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Tex. 
1984) (detailing trade dress features of popular restaurant chain), aff’d, 783 F.2d 1062 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
[A]n exposed glassed-in butcher shop for meat preparation, which includes an area 
for hanging beef and for cutting and processing beef; a beef showcase; an exposed 
on-premises bakery for the preparation of bread and dessert products; a bakery 
showcase for the bakery products; a fresh vegetable condiment island with stacked 
vegetables, in part, in original shipping cartons; an open display of bags of 
potatoes, onions, flour and sugar; cases of beverages stacked to form aisleways and 
tables; the extensive use of white tile on counters and walls; dark brown and white 
checkerboard asbestos tile flooring; and interior green bands of neon lights and 
neon beer signs. 
Id.; see also Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 1958 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 89 (finding shape and style 
of glass bottle to be properly labeled as trade dress of scotch liquor company); see also Two 
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765–67 (noting jury finding in district court that trade dress claim exists 
because of unique theme of restaurant décor).  The restaurant chain in Two Pesos had a 
5
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owner of the [trade dress] the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability 
of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”30 
In order to prevail in a trade dress infringement case a plaintiff must prove 
three elements: “(1) the allegedly infringing design is non-functional; (2) the 
design is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning; and (3) 
consumers are likely to confuse the source of the plaintiff's product with that of 
the defendant's product.”31   
B. Same Ocean, Different Tides: Courts Provide Direction for Litigants 
Seeking Attorneys’ Fees 
 
Because enforcing trade dress rights is expensive, some jurisdictions allow 
fee-shifting provisions to offset the risks of bringing a claim.32  The Third 
Circuit has historically allowed fee-shifting through contractual provisions and 
statutes such as the Lanham Act.33  However, in earlier cases, the Third Circuit 
 
“festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, 
bright colors, paintings and murals.”  See id. at 765 (quoting Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two 
Pesos, Inc., 923 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
appellate court emphasized the visual aspects of the restaurant chain, including the “vivid 
color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes” and “[b]right awnings and umbrellas 
[to] continue the theme.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
30.  See Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting 
similarity between trademark rights and patent protection).  However, the Shire court 
distinguished trade dress protection from patent protection because trade dress “does not 
foster innovation by preventing reverse engineering or copying of innovative product design 
features.”  See id.  The court understood the reality that “there is no prohibition against 
copying goods and products.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, “‘[t]rade 
dress’ refers to the design or packaging of a product which serves to identify the product’s 
source.”  See id.   
31.  McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 357 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (laying out framework for assessing trade dress infringement claim); see also 
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing 
trade dress claim to survive summary judgment when business’s nonfunctional features were 
unique to industry).  In Clicks, the Ninth Circuit allowed separate functional features to 
aggregate into trade dress infringement when, taken as a whole, the “composite tapestry of 
visual effects” was unique to a certain industry or business.  See Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at 
1259, 1260–61.  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing relevant framework for trade 
dress claims). 
32.  See Bijanki, supra note 5, at 817 (highlighting circuit split on application of 
exceptional standard under Lanham Act).  The language in the Lanham Act is deceptively 
simple.  See id.  Application of the standard, on the other hand, has been unclear, and the 
federal circuits are deeply split on the requisite showing to prove exceptionality under the Act.  
See id.  At least six circuit courts require the moving party to prove a bad faith requirement 
before allowing fee-shifting.  See id. at 817–19.  Six other circuits do not require the plaintiff 
to demonstrate the defendant’s bad faith or fraud, but rather consider both as factors in 
awarding fees.  See id. at 820–22.   
33.  See Kevin P. Allen, Contractual Fee-Shifting Clauses—How to Determine 
“Prevailing Party” Status, 74 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 178, 179 (2003) (“[T]here are exceptions to 
the American rule that permit the successful litigant to recover its attorneys’ fees from the 
vanquished.  Two common exceptions are (1) statutory fee-shifting provisions and (2) 
6
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applied different standards to fee-shifting provisions.34 
 
1. Fee-Shifting in the Third Circuit 
Prior to Fair Wind Sailing, the Third Circuit used a two-step inquiry under 
Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act to assess possible attorneys’ fees awards.35  
Under Section 35(a), parties could receive attorneys’ fees in exceptional 
trademark cases, which required both culpable conduct and exceptional 
circumstances.36  Culpable conduct is a threshold requirement and includes 
factors such as “bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing infringement.”37  If the 
district court finds culpable conduct, it then considers the circumstances 
surrounding the case to determine if the party’s actions constituted an 
exceptional finding.38 
This exceptional determination is difficult for parties seeking fees to meet; 
the court has construed it quite narrowly and has seldom awarded attorneys’ 
fees—even in cases of intentional misconduct and negligence.39  Applying this 
two-step analysis, the Third Circuit occasionally has not awarded attorneys’ 
fees even after finding a party’s actions were exceptional.40  Although 
 
contractual fee-shifting provisions.” (footnote omitted)).  
34.  For a further discussion on the Third Circuit’s two-step analysis for awarding 
attorneys’ fees prior to Fair Wind Sailing, see infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
35.  See Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring two-step 
analysis to determine merits of attorneys’ fees under Lanham Act); Brooks Furniture Mfg., 
Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (detailing Federal Circuit’s 
application of exceptional in patent cases), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health 
& Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).  The two-step process from Green was consistent with 
patent cases in the Federal Circuit, which assessed whether the litigation was both “brought in 
subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.”  See id.  
36.  See Green, 486 F.3d at 103–04 (providing examples of culpable conduct and 
objectively baseless litigation). The Third Circuit described culpable conduct as that conduct 
which “relate[s] not only to the circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the 
way the losing party handled himself . . . .”  See id. at 103.  In addition, the court further 
explained how to assess whether litigation is objectively baseless, listing “closeness of the 
liability question and whether the plaintiff suffered damages” as factors to consider.  See id. 
(citing Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
37.  See id. (listing various factors used to determine whether party engaged in culpable 
conduct).  However, these factors are “non-exclusive,” because the court has considerable 
discretion to determine whether a party has engaged in culpable conduct.  See id.  
38.  See id. (acknowledging several factors that go into exceptional determination).  
39.  See Salton Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp. 975, 992 (D.N.J. 1979) (expressing 
reluctance to award attorneys’ fees under Lanham Act despite intentional infringement of 
trademark rights).  Interestingly, the New Jersey District Court in Salton held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to attorneys’ fees for intentional infringement of their trademark rights, but not 
under the Lanham Act.  See id.  Instead, the court relied on New Jersey Supreme Court 
precedent to award fees under a lower culpability requirement.  See id. at 992–93.  The court 
used this broader standard as a punitive measure to deter companies from infringing on 
trademark rights.  See id. at 992.   
40.  See Birthright v. Birthright Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1144 (D.N.J. 1993) (refusing to 
award attorneys’ fees because dispute involved two non-profit organizations motivated by 
“[p]olitical and social concerns”).  In Birthright, the New Jersey District Court held that 
7
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attorneys’ fees provisions are subject to judicial discretion, the Third Circuit has 
rarely used this power to discourage meritless, retaliatory, or bad faith claims.41 
2. All Aboard: Federal Courts Apply Fee-Shifting Provisions in Patent 
Cases 
Fee-shifting provisions are not unique to trade dress claims, as they are also 
used to award attorneys’ fees in patent infringement cases.42  Historically, the 
Patent Act has substantially influenced how courts have awarded attorneys’ fees 
in trade dress claims.43  In fact, the Third Circuit’s two-step analysis prior to 
Fair Wind Sailing was consistent with how other federal courts assess 
exceptionality under the Patent Act.44 
Despite being enacted in 1790, the Patent Act did not allow for recovery of 
attorneys’ fees until 1946, when Congress amended it to include a discretionary 
provision based on the court’s addition of the exceptional standard.45  Courts 
have possessed the power to award attorneys’ fees since 1946, although they 
have rarely exercised it because “[t]hey viewed the award of fees . . . as 
appropriate ‘only in extraordinary circumstances.’”46 
 
defendants were willful and fraudulent in their infringement of trademark rights, but “[w]here 
a defendant’s trademark violation occurs in a non-profit, noncommercial context, the equities 
favor a denial of an award of attorneys’ fees.”  See id.  Accordingly, the defendants were 
prohibited from using the trademark at issue and ordered to pay back donations they received. 
See id. at 1145.   
41.  See Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Steinman, 466 F. Supp. 560, 564 (E.D. Pa. 1979) 
(denying attorneys’ fees to plaintiff despite record that might support finding that defendant 
intentionally sold goods two months after learning it was prohibited).  For other examples of 
courts within the Third Circuit that have refused to award plaintiffs attorneys’ fees despite 
showings of the defendant’s intentional negligence or misconduct, see supra notes 38–39 and 
accompanying text. 
42.  See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (allowing court to award attorneys’ fees in patent 
claims).  
43.  See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014) 
(providing historical overview of attorneys’ fees awards in Patent Act claims).  The Supreme 
Court connected its past reluctance to award fees to a narrow interpretation of what actions 
qualified as exceptional.  See id.  
44.  See Owen J. McKeon, Blurred Lines: Third Circuit’s Lanham Act Attorneys’ Fees 
Analysis Follows Recent Supreme Court Ruling in Patent Case, GIBBONS IP L. ALERT (Sept. 
29, 2014), http://www.iplawalert.com/2014/09/articles/patent/blurred-lines-third-circuits-
lanham-act-attorneys-fees-analysis-follows-recent-supreme-court-ruling-in-patent-case/ 
[http://perma.cc/N95T-SBXQ] (“[The Green v. Fornario two-step] inquiry was also 
consistent with the standard applied for attorneys’ fees in patent cases under precedent from 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which asked if the litigation was both ‘brought in 
subjective bad faith’ and ‘objectively baseless.’”). 
45.  See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753 (“Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not 
authorize the awarding of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in patent litigation.  Rather, 
the ‘American Rule’ governed: ‘[E]ach litigant pa[id] his own attorney’s fees, win or 
lose . . . .’” (alterations in original)).  The amended provision of the Patent Act “add[ed] a 
discretionary fee-shifting provision . . . [providing] that a court ‘may in its discretion award 
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent 
case.’”  Id. 
46.  See id. (quoting Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 
1951)) (explaining that courts interpreted “discretionary” very narrowly in awarding 
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After the fee-shifting provision was codified in Section 285, however, 
courts began to acknowledge and apply it more frequently.47  For example, use 
of Section 285 became increasingly common as federal courts abandoned the 
narrow, more limited approach to attorney fee awards in Brooks Furniture 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc.48  In Brooks, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took a more expansive view of 
exceptionality and allowed recovery of attorney fees if two criteria were met: 
“(1) the litigation [wa]s brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation 
[wa]s objectively baseless.”49  The Brooks standard controlled attorney-fee case 
law for nine years until the Supreme Court provided a new definition of 
exceptional in 2014.50 
C. Changing Course: The Supreme Court Redefines Exceptional in 
Octane Fitness 
 
In 2014, the Supreme Court found the Brooks standard was “unduly rigid” 
 
attorneys’ fees under previous interpretation).  Rather, the fee-shifting provisions evolved 
over time as the courts changed the meaning of exceptional and would not become an 
“ordinary thing” in patent and trademark cases until decades later.  See id. at n.1 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“This provision did ‘not contemplat[e] that the recovery of 
attorney’s fees [would] become an ordinary thing in patent suits . . . .’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1503, 2 (1946))). 
47.  See id. (“Six years later, Congress amended the fee-shifting provision and 
recodified it as § 285.”).  The revised language of the provision instructs that “‘[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.’”  See id. at 
1752 (alteration in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)).  Although the recodification 
“did not substantively alter the meaning of the statute” it would be interpreted narrowly in 
future cases.  See id. at 1753 (noting courts still applied § 285 in discretionary manner 
following recodification). 
48.  393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749 
(2014) (creating rigid framework for finding exceptional circumstances in Patent Act cases).  
Some factors listed by the court include material inappropriate conduct, willful infringement, 
fraud, inequitable conduct, and unjustified litigation.  See id. at 1381.  Under Brooks, these 
factors must be proven by a clear and convincing standard.  See id. at 1382 (applying old 
standard of exceptional in patent claim).  
49.  See id. at 1381–82 (providing framework to assess whether case was exceptional in 
Federal Circuit patent case).  This rigid framework required the plaintiffs to prove both 
criteria to win attorneys’ fees.  See id.  In heightening the standard, the Brooks court provided 
some guidance on the application of both requirements.  See id.  First, a court should presume 
that a case was brought in good faith; the improper conduct needs to “be established by clear 
and convincing evidence.”  Id. at 1382.  Second, the objectively baseless requirement “does 
not depend on the state of mind of the plaintiff at the time that the action was commenced, but 
rather requires an objective assessment of the merits.”  Id. 
50.  See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1751 (“Because the Patent Act does not define 
‘exceptional,’ the term is construed ‘in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013))).  The Court explained a 
new definition, different from that used in Brooks, was appropriate because “as in all statutory 
construction, [u]nless otherwise defined, ‘words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.’”  See id. at 1756 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
9
Dunkelberger: Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators' Sails i
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
130 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 60: p. 121 
 
and “encumber[ed]” the district courts’ discretion to award attorneys’ fees.51  In 
Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court held that it was more effective to construe 
the term exceptional based on its ordinary meaning and found an exceptional 
case to be “one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive 
strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which 
the case was litigated.”52  Because exceptional was not actually defined in the 
statute, the Court relied on the word’s ordinary meaning in crafting its 
interpretation.53  The Court chose to construe fee-shifting provisions broadly to 
avoid unwarranted fee awards and allow for more effective use by the district 
courts.54 
To meet the new threshold requirement established in Octane Fitness, a 
court must find “(a) there is an unusual discrepancy in the merits of the 
positions taken by the parties or (b) the losing party has litigated the case in an 
‘unreasonable manner.’”55  Under this standard, the district court is allowed to 
consider the losing party’s blameworthiness.56  In Octane Fitness, the Supreme 
Court provided further clarification to judges and litigators by directing them to 
consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether litigation tactics meet the definition 
of exceptional in order to merit an award of attorneys’ fees.57 
III. FAIR WIND SAILING, INC. V. DEMPSTER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
ADOPTS AN EXPANSIVE DEFINITION OF EXCEPTIONAL AND LEAVES 
 
51.  See id. at 1755–8 (rejecting Brooks standard).  The Court relied on the plain text of 
§ 285 to strike down the two-step approach because the statute “imposes one and only one 
constraint on district courts’ discretion to award attorneys’ fees in patent litigation: The power 
is reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.”  See id. at 1755–56. 
52.  See id. at 1756 (determining substantive strength of litigation position requires 
consideration of both case facts and governing law).  The Court leaves considerable discretion 
to the district courts because “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these 
determinations” and “equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations 
we have identified.’”  See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 
517, 534 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53.  See Exceptional, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/exceptional [http://perma.cc/8XER-TQLC] (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) 
(defining exceptional as uncommon, rare, or not ordinary).  The dictionary definition of 
exceptional has not changed since 1952, but judicial interpretation and application of the term 
has changed its meaning in certain contexts.  See, e.g., Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 
764 F.3d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (providing new definition for Lanham Act cases). 
54.  See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“[Brooks would] appear to render § 285 
largely superfluous.”).  
55.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315 (providing framework for new definition of 
exceptional under Lanham Act) (citing Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756).  However, this 
new framework was left to the discretion of the district courts as they have “unparalleled 
knowledge of the litigation and the parties.”  See id. 
56.  See id. (“The losing party’s blameworthiness may well play a role in a district 
court’s analysis of the ‘exceptionality’ of a case, but Octane Fitness has eliminated the first 
step in our two-step test for awarding fees under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.”).  This 
elimination obviates an initial finding of culpability.  See id. (“Importantly, that discretion is 
not cabined by a threshold requirement that the losing party acted culpably.”). 
57.  See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (explaining “totality of the circumstances” 
approach should be used to determine whether litigation tactics are appropriate). 
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FRIVOLOUS LITIGATORS HIGH AND DRY 
The Supreme Court’s determination in Octane Fitness provided a new path 
for attorney fee recovery when the opposing party litigates in an “unreasonable 
manner” or brings a meritless claim.58  Given the high costs associated with 
intellectual property litigation, easing the standards for seeking attorneys’ fees 
is an important development.59  A few months after Octane Fitness was 
decided, the Third Circuit raised the stakes even higher by introducing a new 
standard for seeking attorneys’ fees from a different area of intellectual 
property.60 
In Fair Wind Sailing, the Third Circuit imported the Supreme Court’s 
alternative meaning of exceptional to trade dress claims.61  The attorneys’ fees 
provision in the Lanham Act directly mirrors the language in the Patent Act, 
which allowed the court to easily convey the new meaning.62  The Third Circuit 
considered the identical provisions and held that exceptional should be 
interpreted broadly under the Lanham Act to allow parties to recover attorneys’ 
fees based on the merits of the claim and the litigation tactics employed.63 
 
58.  See id. (discussing attorneys’ fees in patent cases); see also Fair Wind Sailing, 764 
F.3d at 315 (discussing Third Circuit approach to awarding attorneys’ fees in trademark 
claims under Lanham Act).  
59.  See infra note 60. 
60.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 305–06 (applying alternative interpretation of 
exceptional to trademark claims under Lanham Act).  The Third Circuit took inspiration from 
the Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness decision, which redefined exceptional for Patent Act 
claims.  See id. (“[T]he case controls our interpretation of § 35(a) of the Lanham Act”).  
Despite that the Octane Fitness and Fair Wind Sailing decisions dealt with different aspects of 
intellectual property, the two courts applied the same definition of exceptional to fee shifting 
provisions.  See id. (“We believe that the Court [in Octane Fitness] was sending a clear 
message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ not just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but 
for the fee provision in the Lanham Act as well.”).  
61.  See id. at 315 (“We therefore import Octane Fitness’s definition of ‘exceptionality’ 
into our interpretation of § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.  Under Octane Fitness, a district court 
may find a case ‘exceptional,’ and therefore award fees to the prevailing party . . . .”); see also 
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (providing Patent Act framework for discretional awarding 
of attorneys’ fees).  The Court in Octane Fitness thought “that an ‘exceptional’ case is simply 
one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating 
position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”  See id.  The change 
in standard helps to bring some uniformity to decisions regarding attorneys’ fees regardless of 
the type of intellectual property case, that is, whether it is a patent, trademark, or copyright 
claim.  See id.   
62.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (allowing attorneys’ fees under Lanham Act).  The 
statutory text of § 35(a) reads: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”  See id. 
63.  See Perry Viscounty et al., Ruling Gives IP Fee-Shifting Provision More Teeth, 
LAW 360 (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:17 AM),  
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/ruling-gives-ip-fee-shifting-provision-more-teeth 
(indicating that district court’s broad discretion relies on considering totality of the 
circumstances).  This standard is important for litigators because it “can only be overturned 
for an abuse of discretion—the most deferential standard of review and the most difficult to 
overturn.”  See id. 
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A. Facts & Procedure of Fair Wind Sailing 
Since 2005, Fair Wind owned and operated sailing schools throughout the 
United States and Virgin Islands.64  In July 2007, Fair Wind hired Larry 
Bouffard as a sailing instructor at its St. Thomas location, which exclusively 
used catamarans.65  Bouffard signed an employment contract with Fair Wind 
that contained a two-year non-compete provision.66 
Three years later, Bouffard introduced the company to the defendant, H. 
Scott Dempster, and helped Dempster obtain employment as an instructor.67  
After a probationary period, Fair Wind chose not to retain Dempster for 
performance reasons.68  As a result of this decision, Bouffard left Fair Wind to 
open a rival sailing school with Dempster in another part of St. Thomas.69  
Their school, Virgin Island Sailing School (VISS), became a direct competitor 
of Fair Wind and allegedly caused Bouffard to violate the non-compete 
provision in his prior employment contract.70  Fair Wind also claimed that 
VISS copied several features of its business, including use of 45-foot 
catamarans, similar teaching curriculum, procedures for student feedback, and 
photographs, thus infringing on its trade dress.71 
 Following the loss of considerable business and reputation, Fair Wind filed 
an action against Dempster and VISS for alleged trade dress infringement under 
 
64.  FAIR WIND SAILING SCHOOL, http://www.fairwindsailing.com (last visited Nov. 5, 
2015) [http://www.fairwindsailing.com] (detailing that Fair Wind provides sailing schools in 
multiple locations around the globe).  These locations include Lake Erie, Michigan, the 
Bahamas, the Chesapeake Bay, and the Virgin Islands.  See id.  Despite having several 
different sailing schools, the Virgin Islands location is the only school to offer classes using 
catamarans.  See id. 
65.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 306.   
66.  See id. (noting Bouffard’s non-compete provision precluded him from joining 
competitors within twenty miles for two years after termination).  Since the land area of St. 
Thomas is approximately thirty miles long, the non-compete provision would have effectively 
kept Bouffard from working at any other sailing school on the island.  See id. 
67.  See id. (noting Fair Wind agreed to hire Dempster based on Bouffard’s 
recommendation). 
68.  See id. (indicating that Fair Wind placed Dempster on “probationary two-week 
period”).  Fair Wind chose not to retain Dempster because they were “dissatisfied with 
Dempster’s performance.”  See id.   
69.  See id. (“Shortly after Fair Wind terminated Dempster, Bouffard resigned.  At or 
about this time, however, Dempster and Bouffard decided to open a sailing school together in 
St. Thomas.”).  The competing company, VISS, was up and running by the following winter.  
See id. 
70.  See id. (“Opening VISS violated Bouffard’s two-year non-compete agreement with 
Fair Wind.”).  VISS was a direct competitor because, among other reasons, they used the 
same type of boats: 45-foot catamarans—something that is unique about the St. Thomas 
location of Fair Wind’s business.  See id. 
71.  See id. (noting similarities between VISS and Fair Wind’s St. Thomas location).  
Some of these similarities include “us[ing] teaching curriculum and itineraries identical to 
those used by Fair Wind,” identical website marketing, and “‘student testimonials’ from 
students who took classes with Dempster while he worked for Fair Wind . . . .”  See id.  In 
addition, the VISS website detailed Bouffard’s experience in teaching sailing “presumably in 
reference to his time teaching at Fair Wind.”  See id. 
12
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the Lanham Act, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment.72  The district 
court found that Fair Wind failed to state a claim for either trade dress 
infringement or unjust enrichment because the facts did not reach the necessary 
level of “precise product features” to make the companies sufficiently similar.73  
In addition, the district court found that the complaint did not raise any 
allegations that its business features were “inherently distinctive or ha[d] 
acquired any secondary meaning.”74  Rather, the district court found that the 
product features were “functional” and “beyond the protections of the Lanham 
Act.”75 
Immediately after the district court’s decision, defendants Dempster & 
VISS moved for $41,783 in attorneys’ fees under Section 35 of the Lanham 
Act.76  The district court held that a portion of the fees were unreasonably 
expended, but still awarded the defendants $36,347.00.77 
 
B. The Third Circuit Throws the Two-Step Standard Overboard and 
Extends the Logic of Octane Fitness to Trade Dress Claims 
 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, but 
 
72.  See id. at 307 (indicating several flaws in Fair Wind’s trade dress claim).  The court 
noted three main “dispositive flaws” in the complaint.  See id.  First, Fair Wind failed to show 
any facts about its business practice that totaled  a trade dress claim.  See id.  Second, the 
complaint lacked any “inherently distinctive” features that “acquired any secondary meaning.”  
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, Fair Wind’s product features were 
“functional” so they were not available for protection from the Lanham Act.  See id. at 310.  
73.  See id. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry 
necessitates precise product features).  
74.  See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (recognizing that 
Fair Wind’s claim failed prong two under Lanham Act analysis).  Under the second prong, 
“the design [must be] inherently distinctive or ha[ve] acquired secondary meaning . . . .”  See 
id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding that inherently distinctive trade dress is protected without proof 
of secondary meaning); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1434 
(3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing plaintiff’s product as being “inherently distinctive”).  The Duraco 
court found a product was distinctive because of the “high probability that [the] product 
configuration serves a virtually exclusively identifying function for consumers . . . .”  See id. 
at 1434. 
75.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 310–11 (“A functional feature is one that is 
‘essential to the use or purpose of the article,’ ‘affects the cost or quality of the article,’ or one 
that, if kept from competitors, would put them at a ‘significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.’” (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 
(2001))).  
76.  See id. at 307 (indicating that defendants sought $41,783 in attorneys’ fees).  This 
amount was the “total amount of legal fees incurred by Defendants in th[e] matter.”  See id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
77.  See id. at 312 (explaining why defendants did not receive full amount of attorneys’ 
fees requested from district court).  The district court’s reason for reducing the fees centered 
on “excessive billing and vague time entries.”  See id.  
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reassessed the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to Dempster.78  Ultimately, 
the court concluded “Fair Wind’s claim does not hold water” and remanded the 
issue of whether an awarding of attorneys’ fees would be appropriate under the 
new standard to the district court.79 
1. Analysis of Trade Dress Claim 
 
In assessing Fair Wind’s trade dress infringement claim, the Third Circuit 
found that the company’s trade dress was “a hodgepodge of unconnected pieces 
of its business, which together do not comprise any sort of composite visual 
effect.”80  For example, the court mentioned that the company’s teaching 
curriculum was a non-visual aspect of the business.81 
Sensing blood in the water, the court rejected Fair Wind’s last-ditch effort 
to save its trade dress claim by focusing on the company’s website.82  Fair 
Wind argued that VISS copied several elements of its website, which taken 
together constituted a trade dress violation.83  This “web design” argument 
failed because Fair Wind’s complaint did not discuss the design of its website at 
all, but rather made vague comments regarding the identical content placed on 
VISS’s website.84  In short, Fair Wind failed to demonstrate how its website 
design was victim to any sort of trade dress violation by VISS.85  The court 
found Fair Wind’s trade dress to be functional in nature and not business 
practice for which protection was available.86 
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit continued to discuss other alternatives that 
 
78.  See id. at 314 (explaining that Octane Fitness was decided while Fair Wind Sailing 
was on appeal). 
79.  See id. at 311 (finding that Fair Wind failed to bring proper trade dress claim 
because business elements were not protectable under Lanham Act). 
80.  See id. at 310 (describing Fair Wind’s trade dress claim).  Fair Wind claimed to be 
harmed because VISS “cop[ied] every material element of Fair Wind’s business and 
present[ed] [it to] the public.”  See id. (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
81.  See id. (explaining possibility that Fair Wind’s curriculum could be part of business 
trade dress and failure to indicate any visual impression).  The court was unsure if Fair Wind’s 
curriculum was “something that [could] be seen” at all.  See id. at 310 n.6. 
82.  See id. at 310 (“Perhaps realizing its failure to plead a cognizable trade dress, Fair 
Wind pivoted at oral argument, placing its ‘web design’ at the center of the trade dress 
claim.”). 
83.  See id. (declaring Fair Wind’s complaint void of any mention of website features or 
specific elements to satisfy requirement).  
84.  See id. (listing some examples of website features that might qualify). 
85.  See id. (noting that Fair Wind failed to include details about its own website in 
complaint).  The Third Circuit emphasized Fair Wind’s failure to compare VISS’s website to 
similar aspects of their own website.  See id. 
86.  See id. at 310–11 (explaining why Fair Wind’s trade dress claim was deemed “not 
protectable”). 
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might be available to Fair Wind.87  Other courts have determined that limited 
protection exists for functional aspects of a business when they “combine to 
create something nonfunctional.”88  However, the Third Circuit distinguished 
Fair Wind’s case by finding that they “ha[ve] not explained how the identified 
functional elements achieve a nonfunctional ‘composite [] of visual effects.’”89  
Fair Wind did not argue its appearance was unique or distinctive in any way 
that would deserve protection from potential competitors trying to mirror their 
company.90  Instead, the court hinted that Fair Wind was likely aggravated with 
VISS for successfully mirroring their company model and competing for 
business on the same island.91 
2. Attorneys’ Fees Analysis 
Next, the Third Circuit reached the issue of awarding attorneys’ fees under 
Section 35 of the Lanham Act and in doing so changed course from their 
traditional attorneys’ fees analysis.92  Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Octane Fitness, the Third Circuit rejected their prior two-step test in favor of 
an expansive, more generous standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to successful 
parties.93  The Third Circuit believed the Supreme Court was “sending a clear 
message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ . . . for the fee provision in the 
Lanham Act . . . .”94  As a result, the Third Circuit applied the alternate 
interpretation of exceptional to Lanham Act claims, thus increasing the 
likelihood that litigants will recover attorneys’ fees.95  The Third Circuit 
remanded Fair Wind’s case back to the district court level to determine if this 
 
87.  See id. at 311 (citing precedent from Ninth Circuit that applies to functional trade 
dress claims).  For a  further discussion of Ninth Circuit precedent and how it applies to trade 
dress claims, see infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
88.  See id.; see also Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1259–62 
(9th Cir. 2001) (allowing functional features of business to add up to nonfunctional look).  
The court in Clicks found certain elements of a pool hall company to be protectable.  See id. 
89.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 311 (quoting Clicks, 251 F.3d at 1259) 
(distinguishing Clicks as “inapposite” because Fair Wind did not suggest its business was 
distinctive).  
90.  See id. at 309–10 (explaining that only unique business features belonging to Fair 
Wind were use of 45-foot catamarans and its teaching itinerary). 
91.  See id. at 310 (“This claim has little to do with trade dress.”); see also id. at 306 
(noting that Bouffard and Dempster opened their sailing school in St. Thomas, in violation of 
a noncompete agreement).  Upon opening, VISS “copied Fair Wind’s St. Thomas school in 
several respects.”  See id.    
92.  For further discussion of the Octane Fitness standard, see supra notes 51–57 and 
accompanying text.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (providing statutory text for cases 
under Lanham Act).  The provision covering attorneys’ fees states that “[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  Id. 
93.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 314–15 (detailing Third Circuit’s decision to 
adopt Octane Fitness as binding precedent).  
94.  See id. at 315 (taking direction from Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness ruling).  
95.  See id. (allowing more discretion for district court to award attorneys’ fees).  With 
a new definition of exceptional, the court now has more discretion to assess the merits of the 
claim by removing a culpable conduct requirement.  See id. 
15
Dunkelberger: Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators' Sails i
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
136 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 60: p. 121 
 
new approach warranted an attorneys’ fees award in this instance.96 
IV. NAVIGATING CHANNELS FOR RECOVERY: FEE-SHIFTING 
PROVISIONS AND MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS IN TRADE DRESS 
LITIGATION 
Intellectual property litigants rely on possible recovery of attorneys’ fees to 
justify engaging in expensive and lengthy litigation.97  Enabling companies to 
defend intellectual property rights is an important purpose given the rapidly 
evolving corporate landscape and potential risk of losing customers and profits 
during litigation.98  These risks are prevalent in trade dress claims where “the 
pressures of ‘[m]ass demand’ and ‘mass advertising’ could quickly erode a 
trademark’s value and quality.”99  Thus, the courts need the ability to sanction 
frivolous litigators to ensure that intellectual property rights are fully 
protected.100 
A. Fee-shifting as New Motion for Sanctions in Intellectual Property 
Law? 
The high cost of trade dress litigation can be offset by several procedural 
options for attorney fee recovery.101  Among these options are motions for 
 
96.  See id. (declining to determine whether awarding attorneys’ fees would be 
appropriate).  The court remanded back to the district level because it has “unparalleled 
knowledge of the litigation and the parties . . . .”  See id.   
97.  See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 84 C 8075, 1995 WL 
221871, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1995) (illustrating substantial time and costs associated 
with litigation of trademark rights).  
98.  See Bijanki, supra note 5, at 813 (noting increase in trademark litigation following 
2008 recession).  A potential reason for the increase is the “poor economy, which encouraged 
companies to be more protective of their intellectual property.”  See id. 
99.  See id. at 815 (alteration in original) (discussing benefits of Lanham Act allowing 
litigants to seek attorneys’ fees).  The ability to recover attorneys’ fees is important in the 
“‘modern’ day—a time when trademarks are increasingly national and pivotal to a company’s 
success.”  See id. at 814–15.  
100.  See S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 7136 (1974) (illustrating congressional intent behind 
allowing parties to seek attorneys’ fees in trade dress litigation). 
Effective enforcement of trademark rights is left to the trademark owners and they 
should, in the interest of preventing purchaser confusion, be encouraged to enforce 
trademark rights.  It would be unconscionable not to provide a complete remedy 
including attorney fees for acts which courts have characterized as malicious, 
fraudulent, deliberate, and willful.  The proposed amendment would limit attorney 
fees to ‘exceptional cases’ and the award of attorney fees would be within the 
discretion of the court. 
Id. 
101.  See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION 
TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT 
COUNTERFEITING 18 n.52 (2011), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigationReport_final_2011April27.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XTM-
M9CZ] (noting litigation costs will vary depending on amount at issue).  The cost of litigation 
varies depending on the amount of relief at issue in the case; there is an average cost of 
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sanctions and fee-shifting provisions, which allow successful parties to recover 
fees for their time and effort and also alleviates the burden of defending trade 
dress rights.102 
Sanctions against frivolous litigators are available under Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.103  A motion for sanctions is appropriate 
when the pleading, motion, or other paper is either frivolous or interposed “for 
any improper purpose.”104  These two standards, commonly referred to as the 
“frivolousness” and “improper purpose” tests, are utilized by courts to consider 
the underlying merits and purpose for bringing a claim.105  However, traditional 
sanction inquiries under Rule 11 are materially limited by the safe harbor 
provision; fee-shifting provisions are thus typically a more readily available 
option for parties seeking attorneys’ fees.106 
Unlike sanctions under Rule 11, fee-shifting provisions are driven by 
policy considerations, such as fully compensating parties for unnecessary 
litigation expenses.107  In contrast, Rule 11 sanctions are focused on 
“deterrence and punishment rather than compensation.”108  Although courts 
may use either option to award attorneys’ fees, a motion for sanctions under 
Rule 11 does not guarantee absolute recovery because there is “no ‘entitlement 
 
$384,000 when less than $1 million is at issue, compared to an average cost of $1,746,000 
when over $25 million is at issue.  See id. 
102.  For a further discussion of sanctions and fee-shifting provisions as avenues for 
recovery of attorneys’ fees, see infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text. 
103.  See Thomas M. Geisler, Jr., Proof of Violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 and of Sanctions Thereunder, 47 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS 3D 241, § 1 (1998) (explaining 
function of Rule 11 motions for sanctions).  Rule 11 sanctions are “intended to deter the filing 
of groundless papers in federal litigation [by] insur[ing] that counsel adequately research[es] 
both legal and factual allegations . . . .”  Id. 
104.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
105.  See Robert S. Gerber, Bringing and Resisting Rule 11 Sanctions, 47 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS 2D 521, § 5 (1993) (explaining two standards used in application of Rule 11). 
Under the “frivolousness” test, the court determines whether a competent attorney 
admitted to practice before the district court could reasonably have had a good-faith 
belief in the merit of a factual or legal contention after an objectively reasonable 
inquiry.  Under the “improper purpose” test, the court determines whether the 
pleading, motion, or other paper has been interposed for purposes of delay, 
harassment, or increasing the costs of litigation. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
106.  For a further discussion of fee-shifting provisions and their ability to fully 
compensate litigants, see infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.  
107.  See Leighton, supra note 6, at 860–61 (describing Commerce Department 
argument in favor of allowing fee-shifting provisions).  The Acting Commissioner stated that 
“[d]eliberate and flagrant infringement of trademarks should be discouraged in view of the 
public interest in the integrity of marks as a measure of quality of products.”  See id. at 861 
(quoting Patent Office Bills: Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 14 (1973) (testimony of  Rene Tegtmeyer, Acting Comm’r of Patents, 
Dep’t of Commerce)). 
108.  See Daniel H. Fehderau, Comment, Rule 11 and the Court’s Inherent Power to 
Shift Attorney’s Fees: An Analysis of Their Competing Objectives and Applications, 33 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 701, 713 (1993) (discussing purpose of Rule 11). 
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to full compensation on the part of the opposing party.’”109  In many trade dress 
claims, “[w]ithout attorney-fee shifting, a company may not pursue a small-
scale infringement that would cost the company more to litigate than the 
company would recover in damages.”110  However, the ability to receive 
absolute recovery through fee-shifting provisions incentivizes companies to 
defend their trade dress rights through litigation regardless of the trademark’s 
value.111 
The ability to recover attorneys’ fees is important and encourages 
companies to defend their trade dress rights without being discouraged by cost 
of litigation.112  In addition, it is easier to recover under the broad application 
of fee-shifting provisions than under Rule 11 sanctions.113  As an initial option, 
parties can use fee shifting to recover their losses before employing the more 
restrictive standards under Rule 11.114 
B. Scallywags Beware: Clients May Seek Recovery Through Malpractice 
Claims 
A significant downside to incentivizing companies to seek attorneys’ fees 
is the heavy burden placed on counsel, whose losing clients may now seek 
reimbursement through malpractice claims.115  Due to fee shifting, thousands 
 
109.  See id. at 714 (quoting White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 139 F.R.D. 178, 183 (D. Kan. 
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 714 n.93 (“[T]he district court on 
remand adjusted its initial award of $172,382.19, based on the prevailing party’s attorney’s 
fees, down to $50,000.”).  As White demonstrates, courts may not give full recovery to 
successful parties under a Rule 11 motion for sanctions.  See id. 
110.  See Bijanki, supra note 5, at 815 (explaining congressional intent in providing for 
attorney-fee shifting). 
111.  See S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 7135 (1974) (“In appropriate circumstances, a 
successful party should be entitled to full compensation for the injuries sustained and 
expenses incurred, since these were necessitated by the acts of the opposing party.”). 
112.  See id. (illustrating Congress’s policy considerations behind allowing fee-shifting 
provisions).  
113.  See, e.g., Renna v. Cnty. of Union, No. 11-3328 (KM), 2015 WL 93800 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 7, 2015) (demonstrating that parties are more likely to get attorneys’ fees under fee-
shifting provisions than motion for sanctions), report and recommendation adopted by Civ. 
No. 2:11–3328 (KM)(MAH), 2015 WL 1815498 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2015).  In Renna, the court 
allowed recovery even though the losing party did not act in bad faith, fraudulently, or 
maliciously, but rather brought litigation that contained “significant disparity in the merits of 
the parties’ respective litigation positions . . . .”  See id. at *8.  Under the Third Circuit’s 
analysis, the plaintiff’s continuous litigation on a meritless position was unreasonable.  See id. 
114.  See White, 139 F.R.D. at 183 (limiting recovery of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11 
motion for sanctions).  The court in White put a $50,000 cap on attorneys’ fees, which reduced 
the defendant’s award by $123,000.  See id. 
115.  See 3 S. Gerald Litvin & Gerald A. McHugh, Jr., Legal Malpractice Arising Out 
of Civil Representation—Elements of a Cause of Action, PENNSYLVANIA TORTS: LAW & 
ADVOCACY § 6.9 (1996) (providing framework for bringing civil malpractice claim).  In 
Pennsylvania, the requirements for bringing a claim are: “(1) the employment of the attorney 
or other basis for imposition of a professional duty; (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise 
ordinary skill and knowledge; and (3) proof that such failure was the proximate cause of 
damage to the plaintiff.”  See id. 
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of dollars in litigation costs can potentially fall squarely on the losing parties’ 
shoulders.116  Most clients will try to avoid paying their opponent’s litigation 
bill, and some go so far as to initiate lawsuits against their own lawyer to 
mitigate losses from losing their case.117  To avoid malpractice claims, lawyers 
must adequately advise clients on the risk involved and plead the case 
accurately to avoid fee-shifting provisions.118 
Given the broadening standards of exceptionality, lawyers—especially 
those not familiar with the intricacies of fee-shifting provisions—should take 
extra precaution before taking cases to recuperate attorneys’ fees.119  For 
relatively new or inexperienced lawyers, seeking out a mentor for advice or 
staying abreast on how courts apply fee-shifting provisions under the new 
standard are both viable options.120 
V. TOE THE LINE: FAIR WIND SAILING OFFERS GUIDANCE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS IN TRADE DRESS CLAIMS 
 
Whether litigating trade dress rights that involve website design or the 
packaging shape of shipping materials, a Third Circuit practitioner must 
consider the new, broad standards when bringing a claim.121  Litigants can no 
longer hide behind a restrictive view of what culpable behavior qualifies as 
exceptional to avoid fee-shifting provisions because now, in light of Fair Wind 
Sailing, district courts are more willing to award fees to parties defending 
frivolous claims.122  More research is necessary to ensure litigators have 
 
116.  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 
2000) (affirming Third Circuit’s award of attorneys’ fees due to lawyer’s negligent litigation 
tactics).  The plaintiff’s lawyers were found to have “engag[ed] in bad faith negotiations and 
then [sought] to destroy a financially weaker adversary through oppressive litigation tactics.”  
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117.  See id. at 282 (“The case involved a deliberate effort by Securacom New Jersey to 
‘bury’ Libengood financially and ‘take everything he had’ by filing multiple suits and 
complaints against him and his attorneys in a variety of legal fora.”).  Due to the lawyer’s 
negligent actions, the Third Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 283. 
118.  For a further discussion of practitioner tips on bringing an effective trade dress 
claim, see infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text. 
119.  For a further discussion on the broad application of fee-shifting provisions in the 
Third Circuit following Fair Wind Sailing, see supra notes 78–96 and accompanying text. 
120.  See McKeon, supra note 44 (emphasizing need for litigators to stay up to date on 
changes within all areas of intellectual property law). 
121.  See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(creating expansive standard for awarding attorneys’ in Lanham Act cases).  The Third 
Circuit’s expansive standard means litigators should consider their actions and specificity of 
the pleadings to avoid being stuck paying attorneys’ fees.  See id. 
122.  See Teal Bay Alliances, LLC v. Southbound One, Inc., No. MJG-13-2180, 2015 
WL 357064, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2015) (awarding $30,855 in attorneys’ fees to defendant 
company).  The district court chose to follow the Third Circuit’s lead by adopting the 
alternative interpretation of exceptional in trade dress claims.  See id. at *1–2. 
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adequate knowledge of the case’s facts before initiating suit.123  Detailed 
investigation is important early on in a trademark case to consider the 
underlying merits of a party’s position and the strategy of litigation.124 
In order to avoid responsibility for a significant litigation bill, parties 
should consider certain characteristics in trade dress, such as functional features 
of the business and website design.125  Despite Fair Wind’s shortcomings, its 
case offers insight into how litigators should structure their arguments when 
bringing trade dress claims in the Third Circuit.126 
A. Stand Off: Functional Versus Non-Functional Trade Dress 
Under the first prong of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish that the 
business’s design or features are non-functional in nature.127  To meet this 
burden, the feature must be “unrelated to the consumer demand . . . and serve[] 
merely to identify the source of the product [or business] . . . .”128  In contrast, a 
functional feature relates “to the use or purpose of the article . . . cost or quality 
of the article, [or] one [that] . . .  would put competitors at a significant non–
reputation-related disadvantage.”129 
 
123.  See id. at *2 (noting court’s assessment that case was exceptional).  The court in 
Teal Bay Alliances held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff’s claim 
was litigated unreasonably.  See id.  The court relied on evidence that Teal Bay did not have 
exclusive rights to use the name “Shorebilly Brewing Company” before the defendant did.  
See id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, even assuming Teal Bay did have some 
trademark rights, they “did not establish that [the defendant] would have infringed its rights 
by utilizing the name . . . .”  See id.  
124.  See Linex Techs., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-159 CW, 2014 WL 
4616847, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014) (noting importance of doing factual investigation 
before suit is filed).  The court in Linex awarded attorneys’ fees after finding that “Linex knew 
the limits of the spread spectrum technology that was crucial to the novelty of its patents.  
Linex exhibited ‘an overall vexatious litigation strategy’ by continuing to hold these 
groundless claims over Defendants’ heads to increase potential settlement amounts.”  See id. 
at *5. 
125.  For a further discussion of trade dress characteristics such as functional features 
and website design, see infra notes 127–42 and accompanying text. 
126.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 308–11 (detailing specific requirements 
necessary to prove trade dress claim).  Although Fair Wind lost their claim for trade dress 
infringement, the case provides an example of the specificity the court looks for in successful 
claims.  See id.  In fact, the Third Circuit made several comments regarding areas that require 
greater detail, including website design and lost profits.  See id. at 310.  
127.  See Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 2003) (“To 
establish infringement of its unregistered trade dress a plaintiff must prove that (1) the 
allegedly infringing feature is non-functional . . . .”).  
128.  See Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (listing 
common characteristics of non-functional business features).  In Prufrock, the court gave 
some insight on assessing the functionality of trade dress, finding that “where the feature or, 
more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment . . . imitation may be forbidden where 
the requisite showing of secondary meaning is made.”  See id. (quoting Truck Equip. Serv. 
Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217–18 (8th Cir. 1976). 
129.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing characteristics of functional trade dress 
20
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When arguing the functionality of a business feature, it is important to 
demonstrate how the feature relates to the source or identification of the 
business, rather than the product’s effect on consumer demand or quality.130  
Without this showing, the feature will not be deemed necessary for establishing 
the identity of the business, and “the interests in free competition permits its 
imitation . . . .”131  By drawing lines between a product’s individuality and its 
relation to commercial success, the non-functional requirement promotes free 
enterprise and ensures that imitators will not unduly impede on companies that 
rely on unique features.132 
B. Determining When “Web Design” Crosses the Line into Trade Dress 
Territory  
 
With technology rapidly evolving in the business world, trade dress 
litigants must adapt and consider potential complications arising in website 
design.133  Protecting website design as trade dress of a business can be 
difficult because entire design layouts are not protectable, which leaves courts 
 
features).  In TrafFix, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff’s trade dress claim 
because the product, a dual-spring design, was a functional feature.  See id.  The Court held 
that utility patents are traditionally indicative of functionality, and functionality should be 
assessed by whether the product’s design “is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if 
it affects the cost or quality of the article.”  See id. (quoting Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Having found the spring design to be functional in nature, 
the Court barred plaintiffs claim under the Lanham Act.  See id. at 23. 
130.  See Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (“Unlike patent law, the purpose of trademark and trade dress law is to prevent 
customer confusion and protect the value of identifying symbols, not to encourage invention 
by providing a period of exclusive rights.” (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (4th ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
131.  See Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 133 (quoting Truck Equip. Serv. Co., 536 F.2d at 1217–
18) (stating Eighth Circuit test for assessing functionality of business features).  The court in 
Prufrock relies heavily on whether the features relate to identification, rather than the 
commercial success of the product.  See id. 
132.  See id. (listing several business components that cannot be monopolized).  Some 
examples of functional features that cannot be controlled include “the usefulness, efficiency, 
or appeal of the product or service.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
relied on restaurant examples to demonstrate that certain aesthetic features of a business may 
be copied by others provided they do not hinder competition or imitate any distinctive aspects 
of the business.  See id. 
133.  See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Should It Be a Free for All? The Challenge of 
Extending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of Web Sites in the Evolving Internet, 
49 AM. U. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2000) (“In the e-commerce world, a company’s web site 
becomes the primary communication center with the customer.
  
The web site is where the 
company displays products, presents marketing materials, and provides sales and post-sales 
support.
  
Increasingly, companies are spending valuable resources to build and maintain their 
web sites.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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to interpret the various elements or “feel” of the website.134  The best argument 
in favor of website protection—the distinctive “look and feel” of the website—
has been notoriously difficult for trade dress parties to litigate.135  As a result, 
litigators should still attempt to argue the vague “look and feel” standard, but 
remain focused on the individual elements of the website claim.136 
However, some federal courts, including the Third Circuit, offer insight on 
how to protect website design under the Lanham Act.137  For instance, litigants 
should provide the court an extensive and detailed comparison of the websites 
at issue in the case.138  The website comparison should separately list any 
specific similarities in order to demonstrate how these features would confuse 
 
134.  See Amber R. Cohen, Note, A Square Peg into a Round Hole: Trade Dress 
Protection of Websites, the Perspective of the Consumer and the Dilemma for the Courts, 3 S. 
NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 137, 154 (2008) (“Legally, to protect a web page layout 
as a whole is not possible with the law as it stands.”).  Instead, the courts have focused on the 
individual elements of the claim that make the website inherently distinctive.  See id. at 158. 
135.  See id. at 162 (arguing in favor of clearer standards for “look and feel” of website 
design). 
Upon analyzing the case law, the groundwork to protect the “look and feel” of a 
website is not established.  The dispositive factors such as consumer confusion, 
functionality, and specificity of claims are all infinite yet so limited on a screen of a 
computer.  Trade dress protection of the ‘look and feel’ of a website has not been 
upheld by any court.  The law of trade dress does not fit the requirements needed to 
protect the ‘look and feel’ of a website.  Nevertheless, future cases are imminent 
and require an active discussion. 
Id.  Some commentators have noted the complexity with trade dress claims based on website 
design due to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to adapt “in the era of technological 
explosions . . . .”  See id. at 160.  
136.  See Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 
2007) (allowing factual development before deciding on applicability of “look and feel” 
standard).  The court in Blue Nile came the closest to deciding whether the “look and feel” 
standard is appropriate for website design claims.  See id.  The parties agreed to a stipulation 
of dismissal two weeks later and the question was left unanswered.  See Blue Nile, Inc. v. 
Ice.com, Inc., No. C-06-1002 RSL, 2007 WL 1046368 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2007) (agreeing 
to stipulation of dismissal).   
137.  See Blue Nile, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1246 (demonstrating willingness to apply “look 
and feel” standard to trade dress claim).  The Blue Nile court held the “presentation of 
diamond search features is sufficient to support a claim . . . .”  See id. at 1244 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Creative Co-Op, Inc. v. Elizabeth Lucas Co., No. 11-116-
S-REB, 2012 WL 761736, at *2–3 (D. Idaho Mar. 7, 2012) (declaring parallel claims under 
the Copyright Act and Lanham Act are not per se inadmissible).  In Creative Co-Op, the Idaho 
district court allowed the case to continue forward, but required “a specifically-defined list of 
elements that comprise the trade dress.”  See id. at *3.  Combining Blue Nile and Creative Co-
Op, it appears that some federal courts are willing to address the “look and feel” argument if 
plaintiffs precisely construct the complaint to specifically list the trade dress elements being 
copied.  See id. 
138.  See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(demonstrating what happens when party fails to provide adequate comparison of features).  
The Third Circuit struck down the claim because Fair Wind’s “complaint d[id] not enumerate 
what specific elements of its website comprise[d] a distinctive trade dress or that its site ha[d] 
any distinctive ornamental features.”  See id. 
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or mislead potential consumers about the business product.139  Providing 
specific examples is extremely important because it is necessary to distinguish 
trade dress from copyright rights, which are protectable under a separate 
statute.140  Developing a factual basis for the “look and feel” of the website 
design based on the individual trade dress elements adds substance to an 
otherwise vague standard.141  Finally, although courts have shown a 
willingness to protect unique website design features, litigators must plead their 
claim early and specifically demonstrate the impact these features have on their 
business.142 
VI. CLEARER SKIES ON THE HORIZON 
Following Fair Wind Sailing, the expansive view of exceptionality under 
the Lanham Act will promote fair and ethical litigation of trade dress claims in 
the Third Circuit.143  The more lenient standard for awarding attorneys’ fees 
requires litigators to plead their claims precisely, only after an adequate amount 
of research verifying the underlying merits.144  Thus, the Third Circuit took the 
wind out of frivolous litigators’ sails by ensuring defendants have an ability to 






139.  See Treat, Inc. v. Dessert Beauty, No. 05-923-PK, 2006 WL 2812770, at *15 (D. 
Or. May 5, 2006) (“The discreet elements that make up the alleged trade dress must be 
separated out and identified in a list.”).  In Treat, the court required trade dress elements be 
listed out because “[o]nly then can the court and the parties coherently define exactly what the 
trade dress consists of and determine whether the trade dress is valid and if what the accused 
is doing is an infringement.”  See id. at *14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
140.  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) 
(“Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been ‘careful to caution against misuse or 
over-extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by 
patent or copyright.”). 
141.  See Cohen, supra note 134, at 158 (arguing that websites containing generic 
elements may be successful if overall website is proven to be inherently distinctive). 
142.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315 (affirming district court’s dismissal of 
plaintiff’s trade dress and unjust enrichment claims).  Failing to provide a detailed complaint, 
the court rejected Fair Wind’s trade dress case and did not allow amendment to provide more 
specific examples.  See id. 
143.  See LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 444, 463 (W.D.N.C. 2014) 
(awarding attorneys’ fees against defendant for litigating trade dress claim unreasonably).  In 
LendingTree, the defendant “failed to produce relevant documentary evidence” on several 
occasions and required several interventions by the court.  See id. at 461.  Applying the new 
meaning of exceptional, the North Carolina district court ruled such behavior was 
inappropriate and deserving of punishment by the court.  See id. at *461–63. 
144.  For a further discussion of proper complaint pleadings following the new 
interpretation of exceptional, see supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
145.  See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315 (creating broad standard for Third Circuit 
to award attorneys’ fees in exceptional cases). 
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